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ncts were to be performed, and a construction of Pen. Code,
§ 653f, that limits its operation to solicitation of acts that
are to be committed within this state would defeat rather than
effeet the object of the statute.
[5] Id.-Solicitation of Crimes.-Since it is the solicitation in
01. this state alone that is punishable, and since it is immaterial
where the acts solicited are to be performed, the law of
other states governing such acts, such as extortion, is likewise
immaterial.
[6] Extortion-Solicitation-Evidence.-Defendant's solicitations
of prosecutrix to commit extortion are sufficiently corroborated
by the testimony of prosecutrix and of a police officer who
overheard them by means of a listening device installed, with
her permission, in prosecutrix's home, and by a tape recording
of such conversation, together with admissions in defendant's
own testimony.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granting probation and denying a new trial.
Clement D. Nye, Judge. Affirmed.
Jefferson & Jefferson, Martha Malone Jefferson and Bernard
S. Jefferson for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E.
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRA YNOR, J .-Defendant was charged by information
with violating section 653f of the Penal Code in that he
"solicit [ed the prosecutrix J to commit and join in the eommission of the crime of Extortion." After a trial by the
court sitting without a jury, defendant was found guilty.
His motion for a new tria) was denied. but the proceedings
were suspended and he was placed on probation. He appeals
from the order granting probation (Pen. Code, § 1237) and
from the order d£'nying his motion for a new trial.
The evidence prf'sented at the trial established that defendant solicited the prosecutrix in Los Angeles to get aeqainted with men at hotels in the Los Angeles area and to
persuade them to accompany her to Tijuana, Mexico, to
engage in sexual intercourse, and to join with defendant's
associate in committing acts in Mexico that would constitute
extortion as defined in section 518 of the Penal Code.· The
.,' Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his CODsent, or the obtaining of an official act of a public officer. induced by a
wrongful use of force or fear, or under eolor ot official riKht."
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prosecutrix reported the solicitations to the police and the
scheme was never carried out.
The basic question raised 1m appeal is whether it is a
punishable offense in California to solicit a person to commit
or join in the commission outside of California of any of
the crimes mentioned in section 653f of the Penal Code.t
Defendant contends that to punish him for soliciting in this
state the performance of acts outside this state that would
amount to "extortion," as that word is defined in section 518
of the Penal Code, is to punish him for acts to be done outside
this state and thus without the jurisdiction of the California
courts.
In support of this contention defendant invokes People
v. Buffum, 40 Ca1.2d 709 [256 P.2d 317]. In that case the
court stated: "The object of defendants' agreement, as alleged
in the indictment, was 'to violate section 274, Penal Cooe
of the State of California.' No other unlawful purpose was
stated, and defendants, of course, cannot be punished for
conspiracy unless the doing of the things agreed upon would
amount to a violation of section 274. The statute makes no
reference to the place of performance of an abortion, and
we must assume that the Legislature did not intend to regulate
conduct taking place outside the borders of the state. [Citations.] Similarly, section 182 of the Penal Code, standing
alone, should not be read as applying to a conspiracy to
commit a crime in another jurisdiction." (40 Ca1.2d 709,
715.) In the present case, however, we are not concerned
with a statute prohibiting a conspiracy "to commit any
crime," however petty, or to commit the numerous other
acts listed in section 182. Two or more persons may conspire
to commit an act in another state that would not be a crime
there but would be a crime if committed in this state, or
that would not be a crime here but would be a crime in the
other state. Similar conflicts in the law of this state and of
other states would also arise in applying the other four
subdivisions of section 182 when the acts are to be performed

t" Every person who solicits another to offer or join in the offer or
acceptance of a bribe, or to commit or join in the commission of murder,
robbery, burglary, grand theft, receiving stolen property, exlortion,
rape by force and violence, perjury, subornation of perjury, forgery,
or kidnapping is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not-longer
than one year or in the state prison not longer than five years, or by
a fine of not more than 1h"e tllOusand dollars. Such offense must be
proved by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness and corfoboratin& circUDlstanees."
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in another state. Section G5:if, however, prohibits the solicitation of ouly 12 of the Illost serious crimes, an of which are
felollies under t.hl' law of this state and at common law and
are crimes under the law of all civilized nations. [1] Since
th~ Legislat urp is not ordinarily concerned with regulating
coIiduct in other jurisdictions (People v. Buffum. supra. 40
Oal.2d 709. 716). and since section 182 suggests no answer to _
the many diffil'uJt qUl'sriolls r hat would otherwise arise from
the conflict in Califorllia law aud the law of other states. that _
section may rpasonably be interpreted as limited to conspiracieloi to (!ommit erimes in this state. [2] It does not follow,
howt'v(>r. that when the Lef!islntllre has singled ont the solicitation of thp most seriolls of crimes. it likewisp inte>nded
to punish their solicitation only wlwn they were to be committed in this statf'. LegisJatiw concern with the proscribe>d
solicitin~ is demonstrated not only by the gravity of the
crimes sp('cified but by the fact t.hat the crime. unlikp conspiracy_ does not require the commission of any overt art.
rt is complete when the solicitation is made. and it is immaterial that the object of the solicitation is never consummated, or that no steps are taken toward its consummation.
(People v. Haley. 102 CaL\pp.2d 159, 165 f227 P.2d 481;
People v. Gray, 52 Cal.App.2rl 620. 653 f127 P.2d 721 ; 1 Burdick, The Law of Crime (19-l6), §§ 104-106.) [3] Section
653f is concerned not only with the prevention of the harm
t.hat would result should the illducements provp successful.
but with protecting inhabit.ants of this state from being
exposed to inducements to commit or join in the commission
of the crimes specified (cf. People v. Chase, 117 Cal.App.
Supp. 775. 780 [1 P.2d G01). and the evils it seeks to prevent
are present whethl'r t.he object of the solicitation is to be
accomplished within or witbout this state. [4] Thus, in the
present case defendant used the> prospects of large monetary
rewards to attempt to induce the prosecutrix to commit acts
of prostitution and extortion, with residents of this statt' as.
intended victims. Such solicitation is inimical to the public
welfal'!> and to the safety and morals of the inhabitants of
this state. r('gal'ClI('ss of wherp the solicited acts are to be
performed. and a eOllstnwtioll of section 653f that limits its
operation to solicitation of acts that are to be consummated
within this state would defl>at. rather than effect, the object
of that statute. (See Pen. Code. § 4. )
Defl'mlant ('Ollt ('ntis. 110\\'('\'1'1'. that sinee he was ehargNl
with solicitiug ., the crime of cxtol'LiOll" he could llot pl'operly
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be convicted unless it was proved that the acts solicited
would constitute the crime of extortion at the place where
they were to be performed ani} that the prosecution therefore
failed to sustain its burden of proof since it offered no evidence
to prove that the acts solicited would constitute the crime
of extortion under the laws of l\fexico. [5] Since it is the
solicitation in this state alone that is punishable, and since
it is immaterial where the acts solicited are tc be performed,
the law of other states governing such acts is likewise immaterial (see. People v. Chase, supra, 117 CaI.App.Supp. 775,
780), and proof of the law of Mexico was therefore unnecessary.
Nor is a different result required by the so-called" Gambling
Ship Regulation Law," making it unlawful for any person
within this state to solicit another to visit a gambling ship
"whether such gambling ship be within or without the jurisdiction of the State of California." (Stats. 1929, p. 703,
now in Pen. Code, § 11300 [Stats. 1953, chap. 35].) Defendant contends that if the Legislature had intended section
653f to be construed as we have construed it,' an express
provision making that section applicable to solicitations of
acts to be performed outside the state would have been added
as it was in the Gambling Ship Regulation Law. In the
Gambling Ship Regulation Law the Legislature was concerned
with what was then an immediate and pressing problem. The
operators of certain gambling ships, anchored off the California coast outside the territorial waters and deriving their
custom from the coastal cities of California, were flagrantly
evading this state's anti-gambling laws. To meet this evil,
which involved the very problem of the solicitation of acts
to be committed outside the state, the Legislature adopted
explicit language to cover the specific problem before it. It
is not uncommon for the Legislature to use more explicit
language in statutes dealing with limited specific problems
than it does in statutes of more general application.
[6] Defendant contends finally that a reversal is required
because his solicitations were not proved by the testimony
of two witnesses or by that of one witness and corroborating
circumstances, as required by section 653f of the Penal Code.
Defendant's solicitations were proved by the testimony of
the prosecutrix and by that of a police officer who overheard
them by means of a listening device installed, with he!' permission, in the prosecutrix's home. Furthermore, a tape
recording of the conversation overheard by the polic(' offiepr
was introduced in evidence, and defendant admitted in his
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own testimony that he hau participated in the conversation
that the officer had recorded and had solicited the prosecutrix
in the manner described above. Defendant explained, however, that he had made the solicitations without any intent
to carry out the extortion scheme but merely as an excuse
to become acquainted with the prosecutrix whom he wished
to know "socially." The slight variation between the testimony of the prosecutrix and the police officer· as to the
details of carrying out the proposed extortion is of no significance, for the tape recording shows that the two variations
were in fact suggested by defendant as alternative means
by which the extortion could be effected. Thus, in the light
of the well-established rule that the corroborative evidence
need not be strong nor sufficient in itself, without the aid
of other evidence, to establish the fact in issue (People v.
Gallardo. 41 Ca1.2d 57, 63 [257 P.2d 29] ; People v. Baskins,
72 Cal.App.2d 728, 731 [165 P.2d 510]; see also People v.
Wilson, 25 Ca1.2d 341. 347 [153 P.2d 720]), we must conclude that the testimony of the prosecutrix and of the police
officer and the recording of defendant's conversation with
the prosecutrix are more than adequate to satisfy the requirements of section 653f. Moreover, the admissions in defendant's own testimony supply sufficient eorroborative evidence.
(People v. Wilson, supra, 25 Ca1.2d 341, 347; People v.
Griffin, 98 Cal.App.2d 1, 25 [219 P.2d 519], and cases cited.)
The order granting probation and the order denying defendant's motion for a new trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,

J., and Spence, J., concurred.

-The police officer testified that defendant'li associate in Mexico, who
was to impersonate a Mexican police officer, would threaten to arrest
the intended victim as a means of effecting the extortion, whereas the
prosecutrix testified that defendant's associate would threaten to arrest
her.
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